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Albert Pete Veenstra, III, #21864
l . S. C. I • ,

Unit 1 3

Post Office Box 14
BO1.se, ldaho
83707

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
ON APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING
Albert Pete Veenstra, III,
Appellant,

VS:

Idaho Child Support
Enforcement Division,
Appel lee,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO.

40683
-------REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
FOR APPELLANT

FOR APPELLEE

Albert Pete Veenstr-, Pro-Se
I.S.C.I., Unit 13
Post Office Box 14
Boise, Idaho
83707

M. Scott Keim, Bar #5879
Deputy Attorney General
450 West State Street, 10th, fl.
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho
83720-0036

ARGUMENT OF LAW

For purposes of brevity, the Appellant will simply touch
upon the Respondents Brief, and will conclusively show that he
is entitled to the interpretation of the law as is depicted for in
the Opening Brief of Appellant as filed in this case.

The language of the Idaho Code, ~10-1110, and ~10-1111, are
unambiguous when they are given the ordinary meaning of the words
used.
The plain and the ordinary words used, in ~10-1110 states as
follows:
11

• • • • A lien
arising from the delinquency of a payment
due under a judgment for support of a child issued by
an Idaho Court continues until five, (5), years after
the death or emancipation of the last child for whom
support is owed under the judgment unless the underlyinq
judgment is renewed, is previously satisfied or the
enforcement of the judgment is stayed upon an appeal as
provided by law. The transcript or abstract above
mentioned shall contain the title of the Court and
cause and number of action, names of judgment creditors
and debtors, time of entry and amount of judgment".

By the plain meaning of the words used, the debt or lien
which was incurred by the judgment for child support continues
until five,

(5), years after the emancipation of the child for

whom the judgment was entered.
In this case, that would be five,

(5), years after the child

turned eighteen years of age, or the age of 23.
The child in question was born on
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The

Child then reached the age of emancipation when it reached the
eighteenth,

(18), birthday. This occurred on

The Statute further provides that the lien or iudqment
continues until five,

(5), years after the date of emancipation,

or in this case, until the 23rd birthdate of the child. This
date is
Finally, the statute provides that," •.. unless the judgment
is renewed".
This Court must then look to the Statute which covers
"renewed iudgments". ~10-1111.
The Idaho Code ~10-1111,
(2)

(2) states as follows,

"Unless the judgment has been satisfied,
and PRIOR to the expiration of the lien created
in section 10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal
thereof, a Court that has entered a judgment
for child support may, upon Motion, renew such
iudgment. The renewed iudgment, and the lien
established thereby shall continue for ten, (10)
years from the date of the renewed iudqment".

The plain and unambiguous language of this statute clearly
depicts that, " .•.. PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE LIEN CREATED
IN SECTION 10-1110, OR ANY RENEWAL THEREOF, .... ".

The Judqment in this case was not satisfied. However, it
did expire on
aqe of emancipation plus five,

when the child reached the
(5), years.

In order for a renewal of the iudqment to have taken place,
the Motion for renewal of the judgment would have had to be
served and filed PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE LIEN ...... ".
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The Appellee/Respondent in this case, not beinq happy with
the clear and unambiquous terms of the Statute, has asked the
Court to qo inside the leqislative minutes and perform a comprehensive
study of the leqislative lanquaqe of the adoption code for the
amendments to these statutes.
Not only does this violate the principles of statutory
interpretation, but the Respondent/Appellee has made a very
erroneous interpretation of the legislative enactment(s).
"Legislative intent must be determined from the plain meaninq
of the words used, and if plain and unambiquous, direct and certain,
the statute speaks for itself". Crist V. Seqna, 622 P.2d 1028, 1029,
(1981).

In this case, there is no confusing the words used, nor the
intent of the legislature. Therefore, the statute speaks for
itself. It was error to look further into the Statute than what
the Statute itself said.
The interpretation used by the Court,

(At the behest of the

Respondent), leaves a portion of the Statute meaningless. Under
the interpretation as used by the Magistrate Judqe, and the
Respondent/Appellee, the portion of the Statute,

(10-1111,

(2)),

which states, " ..•• Prior to the expiration of the lien created in
section 10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof •.. ", would have
absolutely no meaning what-so-ever, and therefore it makes the
Idaho Code 10-1110, and 10-1111, (2), incompatible with each other.
On the other hand, the reading as put forward by the
Appellant,

(In the Maqistrate Court), is the correct readinq of
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the two statutes in question because in qives meaning and effect
to all provisions of the two statutes.
"It is well established that a Court must give meaning and
effect to all statutory provisions". Montana Highway Contractors
V. Department of Highways, 715 P.2d 1056, 1058, (1986).
Under the interpretation as suggested or as used by the
Magistrate Judge, the provisions of the Idaho Code ~10-1111,

(2)

are not allowed to have meaning at all.
In Idaho it is well settled that, " .• in determining the
ordinary meaning of a statute, effect must be given to all the
words, ... so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant".
State V. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, at 109, 138 P.3d 308, at 309,

(2006);

Norton V. Dept of Emp't, 94 Idaho 924, at 928, 500 P.2d 825, at 829,
(1972).

Instead of reading what is in the Statutes, the Magistrate
Judge, at the request of the Respondent/Appellee, went inside of
the legislation that created the 2011 amedments to the Statutes
in question.
Not only is this not the way that Statutes are interpreted,
but it has created an impossible result.
The Respondent/Appellee relies on the renewal language of
Section 5, of the Act of March 22nd, 2011, Ch 104, 2011 Idaho Sess.
Laws 267-269,

(As amended by act of April 14th, 2011, ch. 331,

2011 Sess. Laws 968), to support their claim that the Judgment in
question can be renewed.
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The Problem with the interpretation used by the Magistrate
Judge is as follows:
Section 5 of the aforementioned session laws, states as
follows,
" .•• this act shall be in full force and effect, •..
retroactively to July 1, 1995, and shall apply
to all orders currently being enforced by the
... department •.. such that any Idaho judgment for
child support that would otherwise have expired
since July 1, 1995, may be renewed on or before
December 30, 2011".
This language brings forth two very important facts, both
of which effect the Jurisdiction of the Court to have renewed the
Judgment in this case.
First, when Section 5,

(As cited above), states, " .•. judgment

for child support that would otherwise have expired .•. ", it
does not apply to the Appellant because his judgment DID EXPIRE.
Section 5 is speaking in terms and in meaning of judgments that
would have·"OTHERWISE EXPIRED".

The Legislative body is talking

about judgments that if not renewed, will expire. It is not speaking
in terms of judgments who have ALREADY EXPIRED, such as the
judgment in this case, that expired on
Secondly, section 5, in it's final sentence states, " ... may
be renewed on or before December 30, 2011".
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DOES THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BAR THE RENEWED JUDGMENT ACTION
If a Judgment has become final, either because no appeal
was taken or because appeals have been exhausted, Res Judicata will
bar consideration of any later challenge to the Judgment, without
regard to whether the Court that originally heard the case did so
erroneously. Kontrick V. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 n.9, 124 S.Ct.
906, 916, 157 L.Ed.2d 867,

(2007).

The Judgment in this case was final when it was entered on
July 17, 1991. There was no appeal taken from that Judgment.
The Judgment expired on
year later, the Department,

More than a

(e.i., Plaintiff), has attempted to

re-litigate the Judgment. This action is barred by the Doctrine of
Res Judicated and or Collateral Estoppel.
Res Judicata is an affirmative defense. Please see, Taylor
V. Sturgell, 128

s.

Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155,

(2008). Once an

affirmative defense is pled, and the pleading party has shown some
evidence of the defense,

(By a preponderance of the evidence), the

burden then shifts to the adverse party to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the affirmative defense does not work to dismiss the
action.
In this case, it is clear that the parties are the same in
this action as they were to this same action in 1991. It is also
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u8i.ore the Cct:tri:.. werE:

tiw oaxaci.: s~n18 issues as wa..:: before the

Cvu.rt in 190'1, when cliE: 0rig:i.i1al Judgiilt2nt was e11tGred.

In 1991 the Appellee prevailed. Unfortunately, the Appellee
allowed the judgment to expire without renewing it in a timely
manner, and that action makes it impossible for this Court or
any Court to renew the judgment. The action of allowing the
judgment to expire, and then attempting to relitigate the facts
and or the judgment itself, would violate the principles of Res
Judicata, and or Collateral Estoppel.

THE APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED
The District Court Clerk's Report of Action clearly shows
that the Appellant sought a default judgment against the Appellee.
The Appellant also Moved the Court to set for a hearing his
Motion for entry of default judgment. This is also made clear by
the District Court Clerk's Report of Action. The Motion for entry
of default judgment,

( Motion for a hearing), was filed in the

District Court Clerk's Office on March 5th, 2012, and it does
FIi

in fact appear in the Clerk's Report of Action. 1
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54,

(c), makes the

following provision:
"The default Judgment provisions of this rule
embodies the essentials of Due Process and
Fundamental fairness and of fair play".
Johnson V. Hartford ins., 99 Idaho 134,
578 P.2d 676, (1978).
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!fl 1. Appellants Motion For Hearing, is not
part of the Clerks Record on Appeal, but
is noted as .being filed on 03/05/12, of
the ROA, on page 3 of the Clerks Record
on appeal.

How has this "fair play" been granted to the Appellant
when he is held to certain standards and rules but the Respondent
is not? If the Appellant would have been late in filinq a
document, it is a guarantee that the Court would have entered
iudgment against him.
The Appellant is a prisoner, with absolutely no access to
any case law, and very limited access to Court Rules. The Respondent
seems to rely upon cases where one party is not a prisoner to
arque that,

11

•••

in Idaho pro-se filings are held to the same

standards as attorney's". This is simply not applicable to Pro-Se
PRISONER"S. Irregardless of the state of Idaho law, the law from

the United States Supreme Court in the case of Haines V. Kerner,
404

u.s.

519,

92

s.ct.

594,

30 L.Ed.2d 652,

(1972), that has

established that pro-se Prisoners are held to the less stringent
standards of the law.
This is based upon the fact that States, by and through the
different offices, will take advantage of prisoners who have no
type of case law available to them, who have no access to books
to ascertain deadlines, and proper procedures, and thereby these
inmate's would automatically lose in Court.
This falls squarely into this case. The Respondent is taking
advantage of this situation. In Idaho it violates policy for inmates
to possess case law.

(It is not available to inmates). There is

no Law Library. There are no legal resources to conduct research.
(By policy). And yet the Respondent would hold that the Appellant
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is to be held to the same standards as an attorney. It makes no
sense at all.
The Appellant did not initiate this proceedinq. It was the
Respondent who is attemptinq to "Time travel" and re-open a case
that was expired.
The Respondent is an assistant Attorney General for the
State of Idaho. He knows that the Appellant can not possibly have
his documents in the same form as an attorney; because he knows
that inmates are not allowed to have case law, and that there is
no law library for inmates to use.
In short, the Appellant properly souqht default iudgment,
and the Court abused it's discretion when it failed to rule on
that Motion.
CONCLUSION

The Appellant has shown that certain portions of the laws of
the State of Idaho would be made meaninqless under the interpretation
of the Statutes as the Respondent would have this Court rule.
The Appellant's arqument is concise and is in conformity to
the laws of the State of Idaho.
Based upon the arguments as put forward by the Appellant in
the Opening brief of Appellant, it is clear that this Court should
qrant to the Appellant the Relief he souqht.
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OATH OF APPELLANT

Comes now, Albert Pete Veenstra, III, who avers and states
that he has read the enclosed Reply Brief of Appellant. That he
Knows the contents thereof and believes them

to be true and

correct to the best of his belief.

_1l_lfr

JVYf7

Affiert Pet~ Veenstra, III Pro-S
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f-.27-)3
Dated

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Albert Pete Veenstra, III, do Certify that I served a
copy of the enclosed Reply

Brief of Appellant, upon the parties

entitled to such service by depositing a copy of the said same
in the Un i ted States Mail, First Class Postage pre-paid and
addressed as follows:
M. Scott Keim
Office of the Att. Gen
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho
83720-0036

Clerk of the Court
Idaho State Supreme Court
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho
83720-0101
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Albert Pee
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eenstra, III, ~ro-Se

rDated
~tJ. 1-13

